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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Cases
Appellant John Robert Rodriguez appeals from his judgment of conviction, suspended

sentence and order of probation for selling a firearm to a gang-member in violation ofl.C. §
18-8505. Specifically, after a day working at his fencing job, Mr. Rodriguez sold his personal
pistol to an individual with visible gang tattoos and who had previously disclosed affiliation with
the Norteno gang. Both Mr. Rodriguez and the firearm's purchaser- actually an informant paid
by the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco (ATF) -

could legally possess the firearm and,

but for Mr. Rodriguez's knowledge of the informant's gang allegiance, the sale was a lawful
private sale. Indeed, the jury acquitted Mr. Rodriguez of selling the firearm for the gang's
benefit, in association with the gang, or at its direction with the intent to promote, facilitate, or
assist the criminal gang's activities.
By making it a felony to sell or give a firearm to a gang member without any nexus to
criminal or gang activity, I.C. § 18-8505 violates the freedom to associate as protected by the
First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Moreover,
criminalizing the sale of firearms to gang members, who do not intend to commit a crime and
who can legally possess a firearm, I.C. § 18-8505 substantially infringes on the core protections
of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution while failing to further the statute's
aim to curb gang use of firearms in criminal activity. Accordingly, Mr. Rodriguez's conviction is
unconstitutional and must be vacated.

1

B.

General Course of Proceedings
An individual who had joined the Norteno gang at about age thirteen became an ATF

informant after he agreed to help the ATF and his pending firearm charges in Washington state
were dismissed. Tr. p. 127-128, p. 135-136, p. 169. According to the state's gang expert at trial,
"Norteno," or "Northerner" refers to a gang that originated in Northern California. Tr. p. 220.
N orteno qualifies as a gang in Idaho because it has three or more documented members that
identify by a common sign symbol or insignia. Tr. p. 221 Specifically, with Nortenos utilize the
number fourteen, which represents the letter "N" in the alphabet, the letter "N" or the word
Norteno or Norte, the Aztec warbird, which they adopted from the United Farm Workers Labor
Aztec mythology including Aztec numbering to display number fourteen. Tr. p. 222-23. The
expert testified that drug trafficking was the primary criminal activity in the N orteno gang and
that the gang gathers firearms to protect again threats of violence. Tr. p. 227-28. The detective
testified that the N orteno gang had committed crimes that are enumerated as specific to gangs,
and that at least more than one member had committed at least one of those crimes. Tr. p. 222
The ATF paid the informant to move to Idaho and ask local Nortenos to sell him guns.
The informant met a Norteno named "Frog"I at a barbershop and, on another occasion, met Mr.
Rodriguez at his cousin's apartment, where the informant was visiting with his wife and kids. Tr.
p. 187. According to the informant's testimony, Mr. Rodriguez introduced himself as Norteno

Mr. Rodriguez's case was consolidated with another individual, who was charged with activity
underlying count two of the indictment. The district court granted the co-defendant's Rule 29
motion and the jury acquitted Mr. Rodriguez of the charge associated with the co-defendant. Tr.
268-69; R. 89.
1

2

and knew the informant was Norteno, both because he saw the visible gang-related tattoo on the
informant's face and because the informant introduced himself as Norteno. Tr. p. 141.
The informant thereafter repeatedly asked Mr. Rodriguez whether he had firearms for
sale and, after declining several times, Mr. Rodriguez agreed to sell the informant his personal .
357 Magnum. Tr. p. 190; Ex 1. On July 26, 2017, Mr. Rodriguez met with the informant to sell
his pistol still dressed in work clothes, dirty from his fencing job. Tr. p. 191, In 20-25; Ex. 4.
On December 15, 2017, the state charged Mr. Rodriguez with two counts of providing a
firearm to a criminal gang member in violation of I.C. § 18-8505 and with a "gang enhancement,
pursuant to LC. § 18- 8503(1)(b) for allegedly giving possession .357 handgun to a gang member
for the benefit of, or at the direction of, or in association with a gang or criminal gang member
with specific intent to promote, facilitate, or assist the activities." 2
At trial, the district court instructed the jury to find Mr. Rodriguez guilty of "providing a
firearm to a criminal gang member" on July 26, 2017 if the the state proved Mr. Rodriguez
"sold, supplied, or gave possession of .... a 357 handgun to a confidential informant" and
"knew that that confidential informant was a criminal gang member." R. 72. The district court
instructed the jury that if it found Mr. Rodriguez guilty of "Providing a Firearm to a Criminal
Gang Member," it must consider whether he committed such crime "with the intent to promote
criminal gang activity" knowingly engage in the activity "for the benefit of, or at the direction of,

The indictment apparently remains under seal and is included in the appellate record as a
confidential exhibit.

2
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or in association with a criminal gang or criminal gang member with the specific intent to
promote, facilitate, or assist the activities of the criminal gang." R. 74.
The jury found Mr. Rodriguez guilty of supplying a firearm to a gang member and
acquitted him of the enhancement for providing the firearm to further criminal gang purposes. R.
88. The district court suspended a unified sentence often years and placed Mr. Rodriguez on
probation for ten years. R. 228.
On September 4, 2018, Mr. Rodriguez wrote the district court seeking direction on how
to appeal his conviction. R. 236. Mr. Rodriguez explained he had attempted to contact the
attorney who represented him at trial several times since his sentencing to request that he file a
notice of appeal and had been unable to communicate with him. R. 236. Mr. Rodriguez indicated
he communicated with the public defender and was advised that his private attorney had to file
the appeal, since the public defender had not been appointed. R. 236. Mr. Rodriguez explained he
no longer had funds to hire private counsel and reiterated his desire to appeal. R. 236. The
district court responded by appointing the public defender who promptly filed the notice appeal.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Must this Court vacate Mr. Rodriguez's judgment of conviction because LC. § 18-8505
violates the First, Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by
criminalizing the otherwise lawful sale or transfer of a firearm without the intent to further
criminal or gang activity?
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IV. MR. RODRIGUEZ'S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR SELLING
A FIREARM TO A GANG MEMBER, WHERE THE JURY ACQUITTED HIM OF
SELLING THE FIREM TO PROMOTE GANG OR CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES,
VIOLATES THE FIRST, SECOND AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND MUST BE VACATED

According to the "Idaho Criminal Gang Enforcement Act," LC.§ 18-8501 et seq (herein
"ICGEA"), a person commits a felony when he sells or gives a firearm to a person he knows is a
gang member. The state thus charged Mr. Rodriguez for selling his pistol to the informant under
I.C. § 18-8505 (the "Firearm Provision") because the informant had previously identified himself
as a member of the Norteno gang and had visible gang tattoos. While the state also alleged Mr.
Rodriguez sold the gun with the intent to further gang activities, the jury acquitted Mr. Rodriguez
of the enhancement, finding he did not intend to further any criminal gang purpose in selling his
pistol to the informant.
The Firearm Provision' plain text -

and as applied to this case -

substantially infringes

on the right to free association under First Amendment and due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, by broadly prohibiting all firearm sales to all "gang" members
regardless of criminal intent or background and without the criminal intent, infringes on the
Second Amendment's core protection to self-defense. Because the jury acquitted Mr. Rodriguez
of intending to further gang activity, his "crime" lacks any nexus with the harm sought to be
remedied by the ICGEA's firearm provision. Accordingly, this Court should find I.C. § 18-8505
unconstitutional and vacate Mr. Rodriguez's judgment of conviction.
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A.

Standard of Review
This Court will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if there is

substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved the
crime's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wilson, 165 Idaho 64, 438 P.3d
302, 304-05 (2019); State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 572, 388 P.3d 583, 586 (2017).
Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,598,261 P.3d
853, 875 (2011); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). The party
challenging a statute on constitutional grounds must establish that the statute is unconstitutional
by overcoming a strong presumption of validity as appellate courts are obligated to seek an
interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 689,
390 P.3d 412, 415 (2017); State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 418, 272 P.3d 382, 390 (2012).
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutional "on its face" or "as applied" to the
party's conduct. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 240--41, 207 P.3d 963, 971-72
(2009). An as-applied constitutional challenge is based on the particular facts of a defendant's
case, which are generally ascertained at trial. Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 426-27, 272 P.3d at
398-99; State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261,263, 192 P.3d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 2008). If a statute as
applied to a particular defendant infringes upon his or her freedom of speech protected by the
First Amendment, the defendant's conviction must be reversed without any showing that such
infringement was substantial. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); State v. Poe, 139 Idaho
885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004).
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B.

Idaho Criminal Gang Enforcement Act
Effective in March 2006, the legislature enacted the "Idaho Criminal Gang Enforcement

Act," LC. § 18-8501 et seq (herein "ICGEA"), to provide "law enforcement agencies,
prosecutors, and judges" necessary tools to address increasingly prevalent "gang activity." 2006
Idaho Laws Ch. 184 (S.B. 1336) (Statement of Purpose). The ICGEAprovided "definitions;
extend[ ed] sentences for gang members who commit certain crimes; criminaliz[ ed] recruitment
of criminal gang members; and creat[ ed] a new felony for supplying firearms to a criminal gang
member." 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 184 (S.B. 1336) (Statement of Purpose).
Under the ICGEA, a person engages in a "pattern of criminal gang activity" by
committing, attempting to commit, or soliciting someone to commit, two or more enumerated
offenses. The enumerated offenses range from misdemeanors including disturbing the peace and
graffiti to serious felonies such as murder and rape and qualify when "the offenses are committed
on separate occasions" or by two "or more gang members." LC. § 18-8502(3). A "criminal gang
member" is a person "who engages in a pattern of criminal gang activity" and meets two or more
of the following:
(a) Admits to gang membership; (b) Is identified as a gang member; (c) Resides in or
frequents a particular gang's area and adopts its style of dress, its use of hand signs, or its
tattoos, and associates with known gang members; (d) Has been arrested more than once
in the company of identified gang members for offenses that are consistent with usual
gang activity; (e) Is identified as a gang member by physical evidence such as
photographs or other documentation; or (f) Has been stopped in the company of known
gang members four (4) or more times.
LC. § 18-8502(3). A person convicted of "any felony or misdemeanor enumerated in [LC. §
18-8502(3)] that is knowingly committed for the benefit or at the direction of, or in association
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with, any criminal gang or criminal gang member is subject to "an additional penalty for the
primary offense." LC. § 18-8503.
The ICGEA's recruiting provision criminalizes "recruiting criminal gang members by: (a)
Knowingly soliciting, inviting, encouraging or otherwise causing a person to actively participate
in a criminal gang; or (b) Knowingly using force, threats, violence or intimidation ... upon any
person, to actively participate in a criminal gang." LC. § 18-8504(1) (emphasis added). In

Manzanares, the Court held the state meets its burden to prove a recruiting offense by first
proving: "(1) there is an ongoing organization, group or association (2) with a common name or
sign (3) consisting of at least three members." The state must next prove that the gang is a
"criminal gang" by establishing two criteria. First, the gang members individually or collectively
committed, attempted to commit, or solicited at least two of the ICGEA's enumerated offenses
and that the two enumerated offenses were committed either on separate occasions or by two or
more gang members. Second, the state must prove that committing one or more of the ICGEA's
enumerated criminal offenses is one of the gang's "primary activities." Manzanares, 152 Idaho at
423, 272 P.3d at 395. Section 18-8504(1)(a)'s "active participation" element requires the state to
prove that the recruiter know of the existence of the criminal gang and knowingly solicit, invite,
encourage, or cause a person to actively participate in the gang's criminal activities.
Mr. Rodriguez was convicted of violating the Firearm Provision, which creates a felony
"if the person knows an individual is a gang member and supplies, sells or gives possession or
control of any firearm to that gang member." LC. § 18-8505(1 ). Unlike the recruiting provision,
the state is not required to prove that the the gang member receiving the weapon actively
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participates in the gang or that the weapon will in any way further the gang's criminal activities.
To the contrary, by acquitting Mr. Rodriguez of the enhancement provision, the jury expressly
rejected the theory that the weapon sale itself was gang related.

C.

The Firearm Provision Criminalizes Association in Violation of the First
Amendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees the right to

free expression, peaceable assembly and seeking redress with our government, applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Eljbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966);

Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 423-24, 272 P.3d at 395-96. A statute will be invalidated for
overbreadth when there is a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise
recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court. Manzanares, 152 Idaho
at 423-24, 272 P.3d at 395-96.
The constitutional guarantee of free speech does not permit a state to forbid or proscribe a
person or group from advocating for the use of force or to break the law except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.
3d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 2002). To be imminent, the speech or expressive conduct must be directed
to producing expected lawlessness and must be likely to incite such action. See Brandenburg,
395 U.S. at 447. "The mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
reason for banning it." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
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It is well established that mere knowing membership in, or association with, a group that
engages in illegal and legal conduct, without a specific intent to further the illegal aims of the
group, is not a crime. Keyishian v. Bd. ofRegents of Univ. of State ofNY., 385 U.S. 589, 606-07
(1967); Enoch v. State, 95 So. 3d 344, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). The First Amendment right
to free association does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of
the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected.

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,908 (1982); Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 424,
272 P.3d at 396. States may not prohibit advocacy of lawlessness at some indefinite future time,
such as a gang member providing a blue print to other gang members regarding the best way to
run a gang. McCoy, 282 F.3d at 631-32 (granting 2254 relief because former gang member's
conviction for generally advocating the propriety of criminal gang activity to "teenage gangster
wanna-he's" strayed dangerously close guilt by association and was unreasonable in light of
clearly established Supreme Court precedent even in the context of a street gang).
In Manzanares, the Court found that the recruitment statute was sufficiently narrow to
avoid implicating a substantial amount of protected conduct because it requires the prosecution
to prove knowledge of furthering criminal activity. Section 18-8504(1)(a) includes an "active
participation" element that, appropriately, did not criminalize merely soliciting or recruiting a
person to be a passive member or associate of a group qualifying as a criminal gang, or simply
inviting a person to attend a lawful political rally organized and hosted by a group the inviter
knows is a criminal gang. Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 425, 272 P.3d at 397. The Court construed
the statute as requiring that the recruiter know of the existence of the criminal gang and
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knowingly solicit, invite, encourage, or cause a person to actively participate in the gang's
criminal activities. Id.
A clear and precise penal statute may be unconstitutionally overbroad if its sanctions
substantially prohibit activities protected by the First Amendment. Grayned v. Rocliford, 408
U.S. 104, 114 (1972); State v. Williams, 73 N.E.2d 1107, 1111-12 (Ohio App 2002). In Williams,
the Ohio gang statute at issue required proof that the person purposely promoted, furthered, or
assisted any criminal conduct; actively participated in a criminal gang, with knowledge of the
criminal gang; and that the person engaged had engaged in the pattern of criminal gang activity.
Because the statute required that the active member with guilty knowledge have the specific
intent or purpose to further the group's criminal conduct, it did not impermissibly establish guilt
by association. Williams, 773 N.E.2d at 1112; see also Minnesota v. Mireles, 619 N.W.2d 558,
560-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a statute proscribing the commission of a crime for
the benefit of, at the direction of, in association with, or motivated by involvement with, a
criminal gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang
members was not facially overbroad so as to violate the First Amendment) ; Klein v. State, 698
N.E.2d 296, 299-300 (Ind. 1998) (upholding gang statute where membership in a gang, by itself,
does not provide the basis for prosecution for criminal gang activity).
Unlike the recruiting provision at issue in Manzanares or those found constitutional in the
cases above, the Firearm Provision does not limit its scope to the transfer of firearms to an
"active participant." And, as applied here, it imposes criminal sanctions on a firearm sale that
was not intended to promote gang or criminal activities and was between individuals who could
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both lawfully possess a firearm. The Firearm Provision thus criminalizes the sale of a firearm
based on association alone and without any nexus to the harm visited by criminal gangs.
Because LC. § 18-8505 violates the First Amendment, this Court should vacate Mr. Rodriguez's
judgment of conviction.
D.

The Firearm Provision Substantially Infringes On Conduct Protected By The
Second Amendment And, Because It Is Not Limited To Providing A Firearm With
Intent To Further Gang Or Criminal Activity, Fails To Further The Statute's
Legitimate Goal

The Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms and, at its
core, protects the right to self-defense, especially within the home. McDonald v. City of Chicago,
Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010); D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates this fundamental right. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791.
Categorical regulation of gun possession by classes of persons including felons, minors, illegal
aliens and the mentally ill are an outgrowth of an American tradition of regulating certain groups'
access to arms for the sake of public safety. Nat'/ Rifle Ass'n ofAm., Inc. v. Bureau ofAlcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2012). Laws such as those that

prohibit felons and the mentally ill from possessing firearms; that forbid carrying firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings; or laws impose conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms do not violate the Second Amendment. Heller, 554
U.S. at 626-27; United States v. Focia, 869 F.3d 1269, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 846 (2019).
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The threshold inquiry in some Second Amendment cases is one of a "scope," whether the
restricted activity is protected by the Second Amendment. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d
1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011); see also

Focia, 869 F.3d at 1286 (regulation that only minimally affects the ability to acquire a firearm,
such as a law that prohibits an unlicensed person from transferring a firearm to another
unlicensed person who resides in a different state qualifies as the kind of presumptively lawful
regulatory measure). Then, just as in the First Amendment context, the level of scrutiny in the
Second Amendment context depends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree
to which the challenged law burdens the right. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. Thus, the level of
scrutiny should depend on ( 1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment
right, and (2) the severity of the law's burden on the right. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138; Ezell, 651
F.3d at 703.
The Firearm Provision substantially burdens the right of anyone identifiable as a gang
member's right to bear arms. A "gang member" can lawfully own a firearm so long as not: a
felon, a fugitive from justice; an unlawful user or addict of controlled substances; mentally ill; an
illegal and nonimmigrant alien; a person who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under
dishonorable conditions or who has renounced his citizenship; subject to a restraining order;
convicted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g); LC. §§
l 8-3302B, 3316. Nonetheless, pursuant to LC. § 18-8505, a person commits a felony "if the
person knows an individual is a gang member and supplies, sells or gives possession or control
of any firearm to that gang member." I.C. § 18-8505(1 ).
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Further, the ICGEA definition of gang member lacks a temporal limits. Thus, the crime
does not require proof that the firearm's recipient is an active participant in a gang, nor did the
state introduce evidence that the informant engaged in recent criminal or gang conduct or that
Mr. Rodriguez believed the informant had engaged in recent gang activity. In this case, based on
the jury's acquittal of the enhancement, the statute applies to firearms expressly not for use in
association with the gang or criminal activities.
Indeed, Mr. Rodriguez could have been a Cabela's employee at the firearm counter who
recognized the informant as a fellow Norteno when he came in to purchase a pistol. The federal
application to purchase a firearm does not inquire as to gang membership, nor is gang
membership a prohibited category3 and the informant could not have passed the background
check. Despite receiving clearance from the FBI, Mr. Rodriguez (or any Cabela's employee with
knowledge of gang tattoos) would nonetheless commit a felony under the LC. § 18-8505 for
proceeding with the sale knowing the person had affiliated with the N orteno gang.
And the statute strikes at the core of the Second Amendment's Protection. Take a
hypothetical pair of cousins who ran with a Norteno sect in their adolescence and who would
qualify as gang members despite being gainfully employed with families and having done no
"work" for the gang in a decade. Neither hypothetical cousin is a felon or otherwise prohibited
from owning from a firearm but only one cousin owns a gun. The cousin who does not own a
firearm becomes concerned by reports of an armed robber in his neighborhood, he asks his

3 ATF E-Form 4473 is available online at https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/4473-part-1firearms-transaction-record-over-counter-atf-form-53009/download
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cousin to borrow his pistol for a few weeks to protect his family. Although such conduct falls
squarely within the Second Amendment's core protection to defend one's home and no
categorical limitation prohibits either cousin from possessing a gun, the cousin loaning the gun
could be imprisoned for 10 years, while the cousin receiving the gun would have committed no
crime at all. In another scenario, these two cousins who each legally own and bring a rifle on a
deer-hunting trip could not bring along a rifle to loan that same cousin who could legally bring
his own firearm.
In addition to striking at the core of the Second Amendment, the firearm provision could
not survive any level of scrutiny. The statute is meant to prevent firearms from being used to
further criminal gang activity. Here, however, the jury found that the firearm sale was not
intended to further gang activity. A host of other laws directly strike at the danger the firearm
provision misses -

laws regarding firearms in drug trafficking, prohibiting felons or drug users

from having firearms, conspiracy and solicitation, and supplying firearms with the intent to
further the gang's criminal objectives. But the Firearm Provision necessarily applies when these
do not -

when the selling, loaning or giving a firearm is not otherwise criminal and is not

intended for criminal activity.
The Firearm Provision violates the Second Amendment by infringing on the the right
bear arms of persons who qualify as gang members under the ICGEA but who are not felons and
do intend to use the firearm for gang or criminal purposes. As such, Mr. Rodriguez's judgment of
conviction for selling his firearm to the informant must be vacated.
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E.

The Relationship Between Transferring a Firearm to Someone Who Happens to Be
a Gang Member, When That Transfer Is Not Intended to Further Gang or Criminal
Activity, is Too Tenuous to Support Criminal Liability and Violates Due Process
A statute violates due process when it criminalizes membership or participation in an

organization (even if that organization engages in criminal activity) without distinguishing
people who do not share the goals of the organization's unlawful purposes and do not participate
in its unlawful activities. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United

States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Eljbrandt, 384 U.S. 11; Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,226
(1961); Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 425, 272 P.3d at 397. Because of the value of expressive
association, even government infringements that merely chill expressive association must be
finely tuned to achieve their objectives. Scales, 367 U.S. at 229. The Court must direct itself to
an analysis of the relationship between the fact of membership and the underlying substantive
illegal conduct, in order to determine whether that relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its
use as the basis of criminal liability. Scales, 367 U.S. at 226.
There is no question that the legislature has the authority to enact laws for the public
safety, comfort and welfare and that proscribing harmful street gang activity is a proper
legislative purpose. State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016). In

Manzanares, the Court noted that the Recruiting Provision requires the state to prove not only
that the defendant knew of the criminal gang's existence but, also, that the defendant knowingly
solicited, invited, encouraged or otherwise caused a person to actively participate in either the
criminal gang's commission of one of the ICGEA's enumerated offenses or in making the
commission of one of those crimes one of the primary activities of the criminal gang.
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Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 425, 272 P.3d at 397. Thus, although the Recruiting Provision does not

contain a specific intent requirement, the requirement that the defendant knowingly recruit to
further the gang's criminal activity sufficiently narrowed the statute to survive a facial
constitutional challenge. Id.
Conversely, a statute runs afoul of the bounds of due process delineated in Scales when it
imposes criminal punishment without a nexus requirement that the underlying offense be gangrelated and is untethered to any personal criminal intent or conduct by the defendant. Bonds, 502
S.W.3d at 158. The statute at issue in Bonds involved an enhancement that did not require the
state to show that offenses committed by gang members were committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang and, thus, amounted to enhanced
sentencing based on association. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d at 154. The court reasoned that "it simply
cannot be maintained that a statute ostensibly intended to deter gang-related criminal conduct
through enhanced sentencing is reasonably related to that purpose where the statute in question is
completely devoid oflanguage requiring that the underlying offense be somehow gang-related."
Id. Because the statute "fails to even obtusely target gang-related criminal activity, it lacks a

reasonable relationship to achieving the legitimate legislative purpose of deterring. Bonds, 502
S.W.3d at 157.
As in Bonds, the ICGEA does not prohibit gang membership or affiliation and a
defendant's affiliation with such a group is statutorily permissible and innocuous until it is joined
with otherwise criminal conduct. The Firearm Provision prohibits all firearm transfers to any

17

gang member, active or not and for any purpose -

indeed, as applied here where Mr. Rodriguez

was acquitted of the enhancement, for any purpose other than promoting gang activity or crime.
Without requiring the firearm transfer to be for a gang-related or criminal purpose, it was
untethered to Mr. Rodriguez's personal criminal intent or conduct and violates due process.

IV. CONCLUSION
By broadly prohibiting all firearm sales to all "gang" members regardless of criminal
intent or background, the Firearm Provision substantially infringes on the First and Second
Amendment's core protections. Because Mr. Rodriguez's conviction is expressly not based on
the intent to further gang activity, his "crime" lacks any nexus with the harm sought to be
remedied by the ICGEA's firearm provision and violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, this Court should find LC. § 18-8505 unconstitutional and
vacate Mr. Rodriguez's judgment of conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June 2019.
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